Journal article
Trade secrets versus Cost Benefit Analysis
Publication Details
Authors: | von Wangenheim, G. |
Publication year: | 2002 |
Journal: | International Review of Law and Economics |
Pages range : | 511-526 |
Volume number: | 22 |
Start page: | 511 |
End page: | 526 |
ISSN: | 0144-8188 |
eISSN: | 1873-6394 |
DOI-Link der Erstveröffentlichung: |
Abstract
We argue that administrative agencies should base their decisions on Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) for two reasons: first the well known ex ante effect that CBA make public decisions more rational and second the little discussed ex post effect that the agency's CBA provides valuable information to judicial or political bodies controlling the agency. The ex post purpose of CBA implies (judicial review of administrative decisions) or requires (political review) the public availability of the CBA. A conflict between this public availability and the protection of trade secrets arises, if the costs or benefits of a decision depend on information which are trade secrets. As a solution to this conflict, we propose a nonpublic in camera court procedure which leaves little discretion to the agency.
We argue that administrative agencies should base their decisions on Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) for two reasons: first the well known ex ante effect that CBA make public decisions more rational and second the little discussed ex post effect that the agency's CBA provides valuable information to judicial or political bodies controlling the agency. The ex post purpose of CBA implies (judicial review of administrative decisions) or requires (political review) the public availability of the CBA. A conflict between this public availability and the protection of trade secrets arises, if the costs or benefits of a decision depend on information which are trade secrets. As a solution to this conflict, we propose a nonpublic in camera court procedure which leaves little discretion to the agency.
Keywords
cost benefit analysis, public availability, trade secrets
Research Areas
