Journal article
On the co-evolution of retribution and trustworthiness - An (indirect) evolutionary and experimental analysis
Publication Details
Authors: | Güth, W.; Kliemt, H.; Levati, V.; von Wangenheim, G. |
Publication year: | 2007 |
Journal: | Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics |
Pages range : | 143-157 |
Volume number: | 163 |
ISSN: | 0932-4569 |
DOI-Link der Erstveröffentlichung: |
URN / URL: |
Abstract
Standard economic explanations of good conduct in trade rely almost exclusively on future-directed extrinsic motivations induced by material incentives. But intrinsic motives to behave trustworthily and to punish untrustworthiness do support trade. In our model, intrinsically motivated players are aware of their own type and observe the population share of other types. The material success of various types and their coevolution are analyzed, and it is checked whether the dynamics of the indirect evolutionary analysis are replicated in the laboratory.
Standard economic explanations of good conduct in trade rely almost exclusively on future-directed extrinsic motivations induced by material incentives. But intrinsic motives to behave trustworthily and to punish untrustworthiness do support trade. In our model, intrinsically motivated players are aware of their own type and observe the population share of other types. The material success of various types and their coevolution are analyzed, and it is checked whether the dynamics of the indirect evolutionary analysis are replicated in the laboratory.
